International Lawyer
Volume 11

Number 2

Article 11

1977

The Practical Implications of International Economic Regulation
of Multinational Corporations and Business as Seen from Capitol
Hill
Louis Krauthoff

Recommended Citation
Louis Krauthoff, The Practical Implications of International Economic Regulation of Multinational
Corporations and Business as Seen from Capitol Hill, 11 INT'L L. 347 (1977)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol11/iss2/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please
visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

LOUIS KRAUTHOFF*

The Practical Implications of
International Economic Regulation of
Multinational Corporations and
Business as Seen from Capitol Hill
Shortly before his death, Arnold Toynbee said "our age will be remembered,
not for its horrifying crimes or its astonishing inventions but because it is the
first generation since the dawn of history in which mankind dared to believe it
practical to make the benefits of civilization available to the whole human
race." Obviously today if such fundamental changes are in the process of taking
place, we must accept a great deal of friction, both nationally and internationally.
As the Secretary General of the United Nations observed recently, when he
was discussing corporate citizenship in the World Community,
it would indeed be remarkable if global stratagies which are evolved by companies and
directed from a central headquarters in a major industrialized nation and whose basic
objective is to maximize global production and profits, would in all circumstances
coincide with the national plans, policies, aspirations and sensitivities of many nations,
especially those that are in an early stage of their development. Particularly in such
countries, substantial new investments usually have a very considerable impact on the
societies into which they are introduced.
There is often a wide gulf between the basic philosophies of large corporations and those of nations in which they operate. Reconciliation between their
objectives and disparate styles of development is very often possible; and given
the universal desire for rapid development and the potentialities offered to this
development by transnational enterprises, areas of joint advantage may
frequently be discovered. But, obviously, the conditions of association must be
very carefully pondered by both parties.
Now, some of the more hard-nosed corporate bottom-liners may see in this
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approach an effort to clip the wings of the golden goose of the multinational
enterprises (MNE) without scaring the bird enough to reduce its egg production. Small wonder there is growing concern today about potential domestic
legislative aspects of the increasingly exposed position of the MNEs. It is not
just some wild-eyed Marxists in host countries that are objecting, but many
congressional leaders in both parties. In addition to questions on balance of
payments and export of jobs, criticism seems to center on whether or not there
are revenue implications of overseas production without some reasonable
restraints. Some congressmen are critical that roughly six percent in taxes on
income from foreign-earned sources are being returned to this country at a time
when some of the same people are, in other forums, alleging a serious domestic
shortage. However, before we review current congressional perceptions, let us
consider just how the all-important image of the MNEs has eroded over the past
few years to the extent that they now find themselves facing regulation both at
home and abroad.
About twenty years ago, it was more or less accepted in academic circles that
the remarkable growth of the total output in the developed countries since, say,
1800, was attributable to four basic factors which had operated powerfully and
persistently: entrepreneurship; innovations and technical change; capital
accumulation; and increasing specialization in exchange between persons and
regions nationally and internationally. All four were of course linked together in
complex patterns rather than in a simple linear cause and effect relationship.
Without innovation and technical change certainly capital accumulation would
have been far less than it was. Without entrepreneurs acting to mobilize,
recombine and reorient existing productive resources, innovation and capital
accumulation would not have augmented total output as they did. Indeed they
might not have occurred at all. Without the spread of the market that permitted
specialization and exchange, the effects on output of the other three factors
would have been much diminished.
By 1960 when many of us began to talk about "the revolution of rising expectations," Barbara Ward had already written about the ambivalent attitude
of many host countries to most MNEs, saying that they were viewed with equal
parts of desire and distrust. She explained this attitude by saying that developing countries looked at the process of development in basically two ways, e.g.,
(a) that foreign investments led to a quickening of economic growth "only if
local people share widely in the wealth created if it initiates manufacturing, if it
leads to a transformation of local agriculture from static to market patterns,
and if a large, trained professional and middle class begins to emerge as a consequence of gathering momentum."
Or, (b) "In other circumstances," Lady Jackson continued, "foreign investments can degenerate into pockets of great wealth and generally impoverished
economies. Then it is not too difficult for communist propaganda to identify the
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foreign investments with the Leninist definition of imperialism and arouse both
nationalist and revolutionary anger against the local government for tolerating
the co-existence of such extremes of well-being and misery." A couple of years
ago during the international oil crisis, this second point of view gained a great
deal of momentum. Now, looking back at that crisis, together with its concurrent international monetary distortions and the bribery exposures that followed,
although they were not really related in the causal sense, it is somehow ironic
that the image of the multinationals suffered as it did. Suddenly many MNE
critics began to find a wider audience for their iconoclastic prose. It was not just
the Archie Bunkers who were looking for a scapegoat after those interminable
hours spent waiting in the gas lines.
An example of that denigrating and distorted appraisal is served up by
Barnet and Mueller's "Global Reach" in which the authors alleged (in 1975)
that much of the technology transferred to the developing world by the MNEs is
second-rate and overpriced; and that the corporations are uninterested in
adapting this technology, originally designed for advanced industrial societies,
to local needs. Instead of bringing in new capital, miltinational corporations are
charged with preempting local savings, undercutting smaller entrepreneurs who
are unable to compete for local credit against the dazzling security offered by
the world balance sheets of the giants. Yet, curiously, it was not so long ago
when foreign investors were castigated by the undeveloped countries for milking
away their natural resources and doing nothing to institute production and
processing capabilities in these poorer areas. •
Typically, Professor Galbraith has a different perspective on this, although
scarcely more flattering. A year or so ago, he asserted that the multinational
firm really enters a country to become part of the wage and price making
process of that country, in order to protect itself from the wage advantage of
domestic producers or to be part of the price equilibrium that insures it against
disastrous price competition.
Its protective and affirmative purposes are the same as those of domestic firms. It does
not in consequence exercise an independent authority on either wages or prices. The
exercise of such independent authority, with its damage to protective purposes, is
precisely what its intrusion is designed to avoid.
As Senator Javits observed during the recent investigation of MNEs in
Congress,
the abuses committed by MNCs as disclosed have greatly weakened their standing in the
public mind. A recent Gallup poll shows that big business has dropped to last place in
public confidence. There exists a strong tendency for the public to believe that the
MNCs have little to recommend them and thus to ignore their beneficial aspects that
clearly exist in spite of the flurry of charges about the harmful aspects.
The United States, he added, will require a willingness at home to deal with the
abuses of multinational corporations abroad.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 11. No. 2
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Now this important business challenge will not be met by just writing and
reading articles, like the one in the July 1976 issue of FORTUNE, An Underscandalized View of Those Bribes Abroad. The article by Walter Guzzardi, Jr.,
sounds as if it is the SEC rather than bribery-paying companies that are the
illegal actors.
In order to preserve one's perspective on this issue, it is essential to examine
the basic problem and to recall what our government's attitude has been as the
problem has developed. In the post-war era, "think tanks," foundations, and
numerous scholarly reports, had a great influence in the development of the
MNEs. The foundations that were particularly operative were Ford, Rockefeller
and 20th Century Fund. The series of reports offered by assorted conclaves of
seers started in 1950. There were the Gray Report, the Bell Report, the Paley
Report, the Rockefeller Report, the Douglas Report, the Maffery Report, the
Randall Report, the Fairless Report, the Johnson Report, the Straus Report and
the Boesenstein Report and then the Roth Report, which was issued in 1969.
All of these reports stressed the importance of foreign investment to the United
States and laid the foundation for the basis for the constructive growth of
multinational enterprises.
The Roth Report in January, 1969, was the first one that expressed concern
over the emerging problem, and that addressed itself to the MNE problem which
J.J. Servan-Screiber had first publicized the year before his international
best-seller, The American Challenge.
A few months after the conclusion of the Kennedy Round GATT negotiations, somewhat shaken by the adverse congressional reaction, President
Johnson instructed his Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, William
Matson Roth, to study the future of the United States trade policy. A committee, which this writer chaired in the executive office of the president, held two
months of public hearings preparatory to the issuance of its report, which
included many prescient comments by the president's distinguished Public
Advisory Committee on Trade Policy. On page 71 of that report, the following
very clear warning flags were hoisted. The following significant paragraphs
must be noted:
The effective operation of the Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee will require
more data, in particular, on the specific effects of investment on United States trade and
employment. In the area of trade, for example, not enough is known of the extent to
which investments abroad have generated exports that would not otherwise have been
made. Moreover, little is known of the extent to which sales from the U.S. foreign
subsidiaries displace U.S. exports or generate additional imports.
Another important question concerns the specific impact of U.S. foreign investment
upon domestic employment. Such investment can facilitate the rapid transfer of
production, technology, and managerial skills abroad. In contrast, labor typically has
little if any mobility across national borders. This creates the possibility that, whatever
its value to the United States economy as a whole, investment abroad may displace individual workers-either by replacing exports or by generating additional imports. To
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the extent that this displacement may occur, it will have a direct bearing on the need for
a more adequate adjustment-assistance program.
American and other companies making foreign investments are often subject to the
laws of more than one country that are not only different but may be in conflict. As
business firms become increasingly international, such conflicts in the regulatory and
other policies of countries affecting foreign investment will tend to increase. Efforts will
be needed to establish an international institutional framework for settling the conflicts
that may result. The first step in this direction should be to begin to explore with other
countries the problems arising from the internationalization of business activity,
particularly where they have implications for international trade.
Had these warning flags been heeded much of the present trouble might have
been averted by alert corporate management. What may be another seminal
study which has been going on and which should be completed by year-end, is
that of the Federal Advisory Committee on National Growth Policy Process.
This committee was established by the National Commission on Supplies and
Shortages in accordance with Public Law 93-426, to begin developing recommendations "as to the establishment of a policy making process and structure
within the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Federal Government as a
means to integrate the study of supplies and shortages of resources and commodities into the total problem of balanced national growth and development."
It is clear from several meetings which they have held that many of the problems
which concern MNEs are directly relevant to their deliberations. The committee feels that most people still are thi'nking in terms of our yesterdays, when we
had water to waste, oil to spill, and forest to raze. They are concerned that:
We have brought the world to our dinner table and share with it the fruits of our lands as
well as the technological fruits of our scientists and educated populace. We have been
the arsenal of democracy, and the land of the almighty dollar and like a huge, dynamic,
brawling young man, we have been able to work all day, dance all night and spill our
energies and treasures all over the world. But the world has changed and so must we. We
no longer own or economically dominate the vast natural resources we once did in our
own and in foreign lands.
Most of the committee members recognized the obvious fact that we are using
energy year after year, at a rate faster than we are replacing it, while at the same
time we have been becoming increasingly dependent upon and losing economic
control over, foreign sources of production.
It is interesting to note that there is an increase in output in the last few years
from the halls of academe on the negative aspects of multinational business
enterprises. Meanwhile, there is an increasing flow of articles and congressional testimony from the unions, principally, the AFL-CIO. One should not be
surprised at the rising crescendo because it has been building up slowly but
surely for some time. In 1962, the unions supported the Kennedy Trade Expansion Act, and considerable time and motion are required for a large bureaucracy to turn around on a fundamental policy issue. Yet turn around they surely
have, as the media have attested. The typical union perception has been that the
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 11, No. 2
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multinationals' overseas income receives a much better deal from Uncle Sam
than income from within the United States; that the Internal Revenue Service
offers MNEs untaxable money in the bank on the condition that they further
expand their overseas investment, which of course unions consider as an
interest free loan that is never paid back and is, therefore, a gift. From their
point of view, it therefore follows that one result of this discrepancy, as they see
it, is that American business is encouraged to move its production profits
overseas.
Unionists are fond of quoting Harry B. Henshel, president of the Bulova
Watch Company, who said in an unguarded moment, "[W]e are able to beat
foreign competition because we are the foreign competition." This brings to
mind the opening of a recent ITT Annual Report, which describes itself as
"constantly at work around the clock in 67 Nations and on six continents...
and quite literally from the bottom of the sea to the moon."
Between 1948 and 1973, United States corporate investment abroad
increased from $9 billion to an estimated $107 billion book value. The unions
never tire of pointing out that this phenomenal growth was not wholly the
ineluctable consequence of international efficiency, but that it was speeded
along by tax incentives. Union witnesses exploited the oil crises. Gus Tyler,
Assistant President of the Ladies Garment Workers, wrote, "[F]oreign investment was the easy way to do it, the easy way for corporate expansion, the easy
way to get energy, instead of spending money on energy research, instead of
looking for ways to use coal, we invest in Arabian oil wells" . . . in the short term
this made sense: You could make a lot of money by investing abroad. But now
we have had a shift of power not just to the Arabs, but to the Russians.
Suddenly we are in a vulnerable position politically and economically. In
roughly the same context, Senator Frank Church stated that many basic facts
were:
obscured by a bewildering superstructure of subsidiary corporations, complicated
dividend and investment arrangements and arcane jargon which kept the Internal
Revenue Service sufficiently befuddled that it could never disentangle the substance of
the transaction from the form. Like the proverbial shell game in which the hand is faster
than the eye, the government tax experts could not follow the financial pea as it was
moving around the various corporate shells created by the most ingenious and
imaginative Wall Street legal talent that money could buy.
A more recent twist to the union argument is that the burgeoning overseas
operations of United States MNEs carry the export of comparative advantage to
its logical limit. The multinationals export, not only the most sophisticated
machines for making new products but also the whole plant, the most efficient,
integrated production in organizational technology we have to offer. Little
wonder, then, they say that we find ourselves losing out in foreign trade, we are
competing with the most advanced sectors of American industry operating
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overseas with tax preference from the United States Government and lucrative
incentives granted by the countries in which they now reside.
Against this background, it must be remembered that the Office of Management Budget and other builders of the Budget as well as legislators concerned
with taxes have been peering more closely into what they call some of the new
"words of art"-tax expenditures; and that some of this reaction found its way
into the 1976 Tax Reform Act.
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 requires
that the budget committees and the Congress examine tax expenditures as part
of the overall federal budgetary policy. This requirement stems from a recognition that numerous provisions of federal tax law confer benefits on some
individuals and institutions which are comparable to direct federal spending,
but that these tax law benefits are seldom reviewed in comparison with direct
spending programs. The United States Senate Committee on the Budget
published on March 17th of 1976, a committee print on tax expenditures. This
analysis shows that there are the following tax expenditures in connection with
LDCs:
exclusion of gross-up on dividends of less developed country corporations estimated
revenue loss, 1976, 55 billion dollars .

.

. deferral of income of domestic international

sales corporations, estimated revenue loss, 1976, 1 billion, 340 million dollars...
special rates for Western Hemisphere trade corporations, 1976, 50 million dollars...
deferral of income of control foreign corporations, estimated revenue loss, 1976, 525
million dollars.
Now obviously, whether these are considered "loopholes" by labor leaders, "tax
expenditure" by government economists or equal "competitive international
terms" by MNEs, they will be under increasing analysis in the years to come.
If one could look in the crystal ball for a moment and try and predict some
battles that may be lost in the not too distant future by the multinational enterprises, the first one would probably be the argument over the repeal of tariff
schedule items 807 and 806.30. Not too long after that, it would not be surprising to see the disappearance or at least the incrementalization of the
domestic international sales corporation, which was sold to the Congress in the
'60s as a way to help the balance of payments when we had an apparently
chronic balance of payments problem. More disclosures may be required of
MNEs, both by the United States Government and host countries, over the next
few years. At present, the executive branch position is broadly, that the United
States objective is a liberal requirement for international direct investment-as
it always has been. But the Ford administration considered that the approach
required "to sustain this objective in current environment is no longer laissezfaire but rather the creation of multilateral structures for cooperation and
restraint on unilateral action." That quotation from Mr. Bocker, then Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, also reflects a
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change in thinking in the executive branch.
It can be expected that the Justice Department will continue bringing cases
like UnitedStates v. The NationalLead Company, or United States v. Imperial
Chemical Industries Limited, which as you know were landmark cases challenging international market allocation by major American and foreign corporations. On Capital Hill, there will be more concern over foreign expropriations
which could result in congressional acts not always pleasing to the executive
branch. I am thinking of things like the Hickenlooper Amendment in 1962 to
the Foreign Assistance Act and the Gonzales Amendment in 1971 to the
funding of the Inter-American Development Bank. Although no action may be
expected on transfer, pricing or foreign tax credits, there might be some
movement on foreign tax deferrals, which could be conceivably supported by the
executive branch.
In conclusion, the perspective from the Hill is certainly not that multinational
profit has become a dirty word but just that they are not quite as sacred as they
once were held to be. Attorneys would do well to counsel clients to ponder the
closing words of Adolf Berle, when he wrote in 1954, at the conclusion of his
book, The 20th Century CapitalistRevolution,
,

Corporate mamagements, like others, knowingly or unknowingly,

are

constrained to work within a frame of surrounding conceptions which in time impose
themselves. The price of failure to understand and observe them is decay of the

corporation itself. Such conceptions emerge in time as law. It may be said of the
corporation as old Bracton said of the Crown: "There is no king where the will and not
the law prevails."
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